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Book Review
IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS:
THE COLONIAL PERIOD. By A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 1978. Pp. 512. $15.00.
Reviewed by William L. Reynolds*
Our present beliefs, attitudes, and problems have roots deep in the past.
Insight into our history is vital to an understanding of ourselves, our neighbors,
and our difficulties, and can help us avoid repeating the mistakes and
inhumanities of our ancestors. Nowhere is this insight more important than in
the area of race relations. In the Matter of Color, by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.,
is an important contribution to our better understanding of our past and thus
our present. It provides, from the lawyer's perspective, an appreciation of one of
the sources of current prejudice and discrimination, the legal status of blacks in
pre-revolutionary America.
In the Matter of Color exposes the involvement of the colonial American
legal process in creating a racist society, by establishing for slaves a system that
imposed perpetual servitude not only on them, but on their children as well, and
for "free" blacks, a hedge of restrictions that often differed little from slavery.'
The book consists largely of a description of the manner in which six selected
colonies, representing a spectrum of methods of dealing with blacks, used the
legal process to subjugate and dehumanize blacks. Each colony is presented
separately in historical progression from settlement to independence. Higginbotham analyzes statutes, ordinances, and case law and presents some
socio-economic data on each colony in an effort to understand the evolution of
the legal and customary status of blacks in the six colonies.
Although In the Matter of Color contains little in the way of description of
the everyday life of blacks, the legal material Higginbotham has assembled is
stark enough to reveal the desperate plight of pre-revolutionary black Americans. Consider, for example, the effect of a system that would encourage a 1765
Massachusetts defendant in an action for trespass vi et armis by a black to
defend on the ground that "there is no such person in nature as Jenny Slew Ithe
* A.B. 1967, Dartmouth College, J.D. 1970, Harvard Law School. Professor of Law,
University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Higginbotham gives passing treatment to the legal regulation of Indians and
gives, chiefly by comparison with the status of blacks, a fair amount of treatment to
regulation of white indentured servants. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COl.OR: RACE
& THE LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978). Regulation of Indians seems, after a
colony's initial years, not to have been a significant issue, presumably because genocide
and assimilation - tacit and overt - solved most problems of Indians remaining in the
Colonies. Regulation of indentured servants became increasingly indistinguishable from
regulation of whites, slavery having become a status reserved for blacks. In the Matter of
Color also presents some evidence concerning sexism in colonial life, id. at 40-47, and uses
that evidence to highlight the oppression and prejudice that was so much a part of early
American history.
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plaintiffl." 2 Consider also a 1740 South Carolina statute as described by
Higginbotham:
The statute extended the rights of any white to require any slave "to
submit . . . or undergo the examination of any white person," if the slave
was away from the house or plantation. Blacks who were not meek and
submissive could be subjected to the pursuit, apprehension, and moderate
correction of "any white person." If in the process any slave dared assault or
strike any white person the legislature in 1740 directed "such slave may be
lawfully killed."'
Or, finally, consider Higginbotham's evidence that "the minimum subsistence
level of food deemed adequate for blacks was thought to be grossly inadequate
for whites."4 Higginbotham need not, and does not, write emotionally. His sorry
tale speaks for itself.
The law relating to blacks in each of the colonies surveyed by Higginbotham
developed in a fashion different from that in the others. There is something of a
pattern, however; in each, uncertainty concerning the status of blacks was
replaced by recognition of a condition of perpetual servitude. With this
recognition came the slave codes and repressive regulation of free blacks. In the
North, the end of the Eighteenth Century saw the beginnings of abolition. Until
then, though, Northern legislators and judges also devised ways to control and
exploit blacks.
Throughout the colonies, control of blacks was rarely subtle. Physical abuse
of slaves by masters, summary justice for runaways, diminution or elimination
of civil rights, and rigid circumscription of slave movements and meetings all
served to insure that blacks remained servile. Control went beyond the physical,
however, for the law made every effort to deprive blacks of all hope for a better
future. Slaves were denied the right to marry. Children born to slave mothers
were condemned to a life of servitude; manumission was made a financial
burden on the master. Even if he were freed, a black would find limits on the
property he could own, the number of trades he could practice, his franchise, and
his very movement.
That is merely the pattern, however; the variations in each colony were
significant. What follows is a brief summary of the experience in each, which
cannot, of course, capture the rich detail in Higginbotham's book.
The American colonies' first experience with involuntary servitude of blacks
came in 1619 in Virginia. In 1639 the first statute discriminating against blacks
was passed, the first slave code came in 1680, and an anti-miscegenation law
was enacted in 1691. Rights of slaves were increasingly limited. By the
Revolution, blacks could not testify in court proceedings involving whites, and

2. Id. at 84.

The case was noted in John Adams' Diary.

1 DIARY

321 (L.M. Butterfield ed. 1962).
3. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 195 (footnote omitted).
4. Id. at 210.
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runaway slaves could be lawfully killed by "any person or persons whatsoever.",
Looking back, the progression does not seem inevitable; fear, prejudice, and
greed all played key roles, but in 1619 - and for some years thereafter - there
were other roads that might have been taken.
Massachusetts was the first colony officially to authorize slavery, in the
1641 Body of Liberties. As the practice developed it was less harsh than that
found in Virginia. Slaves did not lose all basic rights; they could, for example,
petition for their freedom.' By the mid-1700's an abolition movement had arisen,
based in part on humanitarian motives. Two decades later a jury gave a verdict
for a slave against his master.7 And in 1778 a state constitution was defeated
largely because it did not enfranchise blacks. Finally, in 1783 abolition became
law when, in Commonwealth v. Jennison,' the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution
was interpreted as granting to all men rights incompatible with slavery.
The Dutch introduced slavery into New York - then known as New
Netherlands - almost at the start of the colony. Slavery under the Dutch,
however, took on a different character than in the other colonies. Although
service was owed the master, slaves could own property and had certain other
civil rights, under what Higginbotham calls a "half-freedom system."9 That
relatively promising beginning ended abruptly in 1669, when the Dutch turned
the colony over to the English. Under the leadership of the Duke of York (later
James II) the English actively promoted slavery, including the sale of slaves in
the colony solely for the owner's profits." Under the English, the colony quickly
became very repressive: manumission was restricted, slaves were forbidden to
defend themselves against assault, and the trades blacks could practice were
restricted. Although emancipation efforts began shortly after the Revolutionary
War, it was not until 1799 that a gradual emancipation plan was adopted," and
not until 1809 that slave marriages were legitimized. Emancipation would not
mean political representation for blacks when freed, however. By constitutional
amendment in 1822 property qualifications for voting were eliminated for
whites, but the property requirement for blacks was increased from $100 to
$250.

5. Id. at 56-58.
6. Id. at 74.
7. Id. at 85-86. In expressing some surprise at this verdict, id., Higginbotham does
not seem fully to appreciate the freedom juries in colonial Massachusetts possessed to
make "law" on their own. See W. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW
165-71 (1975).
8. The case, also known as The Quock Walker Case, is reported in the Proceedingsof
the MassachusettsHistoricalSociety, 1873-75, at 293. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1,
at 91-98, 419-21.
9. A. HIG INBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 106.
10. Id. at 114.
11. Children born to slave mothers after July 4, 1799, were to be freed at age 28, if
male, and at 25, if female; they were to serve their mothers' masters as indentured
servants until that time. Id. at 143. The statute also removed the prior restrictions on
manumission. Id.
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Slavery came to South Carolina well entrenched. Many of the colony's
earliest settlers came from Barbados, a British colony with a well-developed
slave system. A draft constitution for the colony of Carolina, written in the
16 00's, even before the first slaves had been imported, made this explicit: "Every
Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over Negro slaves
of what opinion or Religion soever."" In the 1700's the development of a rice
economy further entrenched slavery, and the system became continually more
repressive. Thus, a slave's status, initially one of "freehold" (with the master
owning the slave's service but not his body), had by 1740 become that of a mere
chattel. Manumission, apparently freely available until 1722, had become so
disfavored by 1735 that a freed slave had to depart the colony within six months
and not return for seven years. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that in
1776 free blacks constituted no more than one percent of the black population.13
In 1735, just three years after the founding of the last colony, Georgia, its
Trustees banned slavery. A generation later, James Oglethorpe, Georgia's early
leader, claimed that the Trustees had done so because "slavery . . .is against
the Gospel as well as the fundamental law of England."" Higginbotham,
however, sets forth a convincing argument that the prohibition was based on
economic, rather than humanitarian, grounds 5 and notes that it was not
diligently enforced. 6 In any event, the Trustees responded to pressure from the
colonists 7 and in 1750 legalized slavery. The resulting slave codes soon became
"as harsh as any found elsewhere in America.""
Of the six colonial stories presented in In the Matter of Color, only that of
Pennsylvania reveals a determined effort to eliminate slavery and some of the
evils of racism. The pre-abolition record, however, could hardly be called a good
one. Even before 1700 there was evidence of disparate treatment of the races,
and in 1725 the colony passed an extensive code regulating blacks. Among its
harsh measures were substantial roadblocks to manumission, a requirement
that children of free blacks be bound out for service until age 21, if female, and
age 24, if male, 9 and a prescription that the punishment for the black in an

12. Id. at 163. It is ironic, as Higginbotham notes, that one of the draftsmen of the
proposed Carolina Constitution was John Locke, whose theory of government stressed the
importance of the natural rights of individuals, and whose influence on the Founding
Fathers was immense.
13. See id. at 202.
14. Id. at 216.
15. Id. at 219-25. The argument is comprised of two factors. First, the Trustees were
completely insulated financially from colonial pressures. Second, the goals of the colony military defense against the Spanish in Florida and the provision of a haven for English
debtors - were perceived as inconsistent with the presence of blacks in Georgia. Hence,
all blacks were banned from the colony. Id.
16. Id. at 217.
17. Ironically, colonists seeking permission to hold slaves based one petition to the
trustees on a provision in the Georgia charter that guaranteed Georgians the freedoms of
British citizens. Id. at 244.
18. Id. at 266.
19. This extremely repressive law was apparently unique to Pennsylvania.
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interracial marriage was sale into slavery. On the other hand, Germans and
Quakers agitated for abolition. ° In 1780 the legislature passed a statute that
provided for gradual abolition although not for emancipation of existing slaves."
The last two sections of In the Matter of Color present a different kind of
story. The first of these, that of the English experience with slavery, was for me
the most interesting story in the book. The common law had known nothing like
slavery as it was to be developed in the colonies. Villeinage," for example, was
perhaps the most closely related status, but at least in theory the villein's
master owed him some reciprocal duties. Villeinage ended with the Tudors,1
however, and thereafter the rights of Englishmen" were associated with
personal freedom. Thus, in 1569 an English court could say in freeing a slave
brought to England from Russia that "England was too pure an aire for slaves to
breathe in." 5
Despite that promising beginning, slavery flourished in the British colonies,
British ships participated in the slave trade, and slavery was widely practiced
even in the "free aire" of England.26 In 1729 the Attorney General and the
Solicitor General of England gave an informal opinion that a slave coming to
England from a slave colony did not become free on arrival. 7
Abolitionist pressure began in mid-century, culminating in the great case of
Sommersett v. Stuart.8 James Sommersett, a Jamaican slave brought to
England by his master, Charles Stuart, had escaped and been recaptured, and
was about to be sent back to Jamaica when English abolitionists obtained a writ
of habeas corpus from Lord Mansfield. Higginbotham's account of the ensuing
legal proceedings is masterly. In a detailed examination of counsel's arguments

20. Higginbotham presents some interesting material on the power of the collective
disapproval used by Friends to pressure their brethren into giving up their slaves. A.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 294-99.
21. Id. at 299. The statute also prescribed that masters were to register publicly their
slaves by a certain date; any slave not so registered went free, because only registered
blacks were deemed slaves. Id.
22. A villein was a person attached to a manor, who was bound to do all such services
as the lord of the manor commanded. T.

PLUCKNETT,

A

CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON

31-33 (1929).
23. Plucknett puts the absolute end of villeinage as the early seventeenth century. Id.
at 266-67.
24. The rights of English women, including forms of personal freedom, were, of
course, a different matter.
25. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 321.
26. Higginbotham quotes an issue of the Gentlemen's Magazine as estimating that in
1764 there were over 20.000 black slaves in London. Id. at 319.
27. Id. at 327. In the first edition of his Commentaries, Blackstone stated that a slave
coming to England "falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all natural
rights becomes eo instanti a free man." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 123 (1765). In a
later edition, however, he qualified his position by adding, "though the master's right to
his service may probably still continue." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 142 (3rd ed.
1768). See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1,at 32t-30.
28. 20 How. St. Tr. 1 (1772). The Sommersett case is discussed in A. HICGINIIOTInAM,
supra note 1, at 333-55.
LAW
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and the court's judgment he shows common law decision-making at its best.
Noteworthy is the restraint shown by Sommersett's counsel, who did not argue
for abolition throughout the Empire, but only in England, ' a minimalist
approach that made it easier for Mansfield to hold for the slave." And Mansfield
did so,31 his holding captured in a famous passage:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law,
which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself
from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It is so odious, that
32
nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.
Sommersett was not expanded by the judiciary, however, and full abolition did
not come easily. It took changing economics and political attitudes to force
Parliament to abolish slavery in the British colonies (with some compensation
for masters) in 1833.
The last chapter of the book contrasts the rhetoric of the Revolutionary era
with the colonial practice of slavery. The gap was wide, but the colonists seem to
have noted no irony when they complained that they had been "enslaved" by the
British. Of course, leaders such as James Otis and groups like the Pennsylvania
Quakers worked hard for abolition on humanitarian grounds. The very language
of the Declaration of Independence provided inspiration and support for those
who eventually rid America of the abomination of slavery.3 And the legacy
endures. In his famous speech in Washington in the summer of 1963 Martin
Luther King, Jr. referred to the Declaration of Independence, saying: "I still
have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream that one day
this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed - we hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."'

29. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 336. Another important argument emphasized
the psychological damage slavery caused masters. Id. at 337.
30. This one-evil-at-a-time approach, which seeks precedents that can be expanded
later, is best known to American lawyers as the method by which the N.A.A.C.P. attacked
segregated education. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
31. Mansfield - in the tradition of avoiding constitutional issues where possible urged the parties to settle. When they failed to agree, he made a statement that should be
graven on the hearts of all judges: "Fiat Justicia, ruat coelumtet" - let justice be done
whatever the consequences. 20 How. St. Tr. at 79.
32. Id. at 82.
33. The Declaration of Independence provides: "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Higginbotham quotes David
Walker, a black abolitionist: "It is not we, but our guilty countrymen, who put arguments
into the mouths, and swords into the hands of slaves . . . . Every Fourth of July
celebration must embitter and inflame the minds of slaves." A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note
1, at 386.
34.

THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA: MAJOR SPEECHS BY NEGROES IN THE UNITED

1797-1971 at 974 (P. Foner ed. 1972), quoted in A.

HIGGINBOTHAM,

STATES,

supra note 1, at 388.

658

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

In the Matter of Color reads well. Full of expressive detail, Higginbotham's
story packs a strong punch. One reaches the end feeling somewhat dissatisfied,
however. There are two main reasons for this. First, Higginbotham does not
make nearly enough comparative use of the rich material he has amassed. 5 He
does not, for example, compare economic conditions in the colonies examined
and analyze local differences that may have affected the development of racial
prejudice and the taking of one path among a number of alternatives. The
second reason for dissatisfaction is a bit more subtle. Higginbotham brings to his
task an unusual perspective, for he is one of the few blacks to serve as a judge on
a United States Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, In the Matter of Color makes
little use of that perspective, other than that seen in Higginbotham's deft,
lawyerly analysis of statutes and case law' and, of course, the book's general
focus on the legal process. It would have been interesting to read Judge
Higginbotham's reflections on the lessons his story has for lawyers. There are
data to analyze in his material. For example, he notes that some judges in
certain colonies showed sympathy for blacks, at least as compared with members
of the other branches of colonial government, while judges in other colonies
tended to be harsh." Why? Can reasons other than individual idiosyncracies be
ascribed? Further, did it matter that throughout the colonial period lawyers
trained to any level of sophistication were rare? Can it be said that the

35. See Wilson, Book Review, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 693 (review of In the Matter of
Color).
36. Representative is the following:
In typical piecemeal fashion, the Virginia legislature attacked in 1662 one facet of
a "problem" caused by illicit sexual behavior - the problem of women indentured
servants (white or black) having children out of wedlock; they passed a statute that
penalized the unmarried mother by requiring her to serve an additional two years. In
the preamble the legislature noted that "some dissolute masters" had "gotten their
maids with child" in order to "claim the benefit of their service," and that some loose
women, hoping to gain their freedom, had laid "all their bastards to their masters."
And accordingly, the following provision was enacted:
each woman servant got with child by her master shall after her indenture is
expired be sold for two years by the church wardens, the tobacco to be employed
by the vestry for the use of the parish.
Note the bias in favor of males in this statute. While conception of a child
required a male's involvement and while often the father may even have been the
master of the mother, it was the mother only who had the additional burden of
servitude. Furthermore, the psychological forces affecting the female indentured
servant may raise the question as to how voluntary her act was, if it involved the
master. Yet, the master or male's act was clearly voluntary and he was at least
equally culpable. Nevertheless the male had no additional penal burden. The society
economically profited by obtaining a servant for two years without cost for her labor.
The child of the union suffered the social stigmatization of being a bastard.
A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 42-43 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 205, 227.
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development of slavery was advanced or hindered by that fact? Higginbotham's
failure to reflect on such questions makes the book incomplete.u
Incomplete it may be, but In the Matter of Color is still well worth reading.
Society can perhaps oppress and enslave without the formal protection of the
legal process. 9 It can hardly do so, however, without the active complicity of the
legal profession. We must continually be aware of our moral responsibilities to
society. In the Matter of Color provides a graphic reminder of what happens
when we fail to exercise that responsibility. It deserves to be read widely.

38. Higginbotham does suggest the absence of trained lawyers from the South
Carolina judiciary may have contributed to that colony's judicial inactivity, as contrasted
with its legislature, in the development of its slavery law. This was apparently because
there was no development of judicial policies in any area, however, not because slavery
law was in any way special. Id. at 208-09.
39. This of course happened when the Jim Crow laws were permitted to exist despite
the Civil War Amendments. Perhaps the most useful service the law provided those who
would enslave was to remove the face of humanity from slaves. As Higginbotham notes,
"The language of statutes so often masks the human suffering which is imposed by human
fiat." Id. at 57. Higginbotham does not refer to John Noonan's Persons and Masks of the
Law (1976), but the point is the same there - that by covering the face of the human who
will be affected by the "law" we permit ourselves to act in a way that does not take into
account the action's effect on human suffering.

